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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)

)

Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)

v.

)

)

filCHAEL NIELSEN,

Case No. 12049

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MICHAEL NIELSEN

STATEMENT OF CASE
The Appellant, Michael Nielsen,
appeals from the judgment and sentence of
District Court of Ciche County, Utah,
in criminal case no.

1526, punishing Appel-

lant by imprisonment in the State Prison.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the lower court, after a trial,

-2-

jury verdicts were rendered finding appellant, the defendant below, guilty of the
crime of second-degree arson, a felony,
and of "being a habitual criminal, a
felony."

Appellant was sentenced to an

indeterminate term of not less than one
year nor more than ten years for seconddegree arson and to a concurrent indeterminate term of not less than fifteen years
furbeing an habitual criminal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Michael Nielsen, seeks
reversal of the judgments sentencing him

to the State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Following a preliminary hearing in

the City Court of Logan City, appellant
was bound over to the District Court of
Cache County for trial on charges of
second-degree arson and being an habitual

-3-

criminal.

(R.

6I

7) •

Court appointed counsel for appellant, Jack Melgard of Brigham City, filed
a motion supported by an affidavit signed
by appellant for change of venue on the

ground that a fair and impartial trial
could not be had in Cache County where the
action was pending.

The affidavit alleged

extensive pretrial publicity in Cache
County, particularly in the Herald Journal,
a daily newspaper widely circulated in the
City of Logan and throughout Cache County,
regarding both the charges then before
the court and other contemporaneous criminal charges brought against appellant.
The affidavit also stated that such publicity disclosed the previous felony convictions of appellant and the fact that
appellant was charged with being an habitual criminal, and that said publicity had
aroused wide public hatred and animosity
against appellant.

(R. 13, 14).

Apparently

-4no transcript of the hearing on this motion
was made, and the minute entries do not disclose what arguments were made by counsel.
It states simply,

11

Statements are made by

counsel and the motion for change of venue
is denied.

11

(R. 59).

At that hearing, in

fact, Mr. Molgard called to the court's
attention the prejudicial nature of the
pretrial publicity with particular emphasis
on the fact that appellant was well known
in the county and that the publicity
emphasized his previous convictions and
the habitual criminal charge.

Mr. Molgard

also stated to the court that appellant's
family was well known in the community.
The public feeling against appellant
resulted in part from the reputation of
other members of his family, appellant's
brother being generally reputed throughout
Cache Valley to have killed two police officers and himself while being transported
by said police officers from Logan to

-5reform school at Ogden, Utah.
At trial before Judge Christoffersen,
the State's witnesses testified in substance that on the 8th day of November,
1969, a fire suddenly occurred in the crime
lab of the Cache County Law Enforcement
Building and "exploded" or "gushed" out
through the laboratory door (T. 50); that
the fire consumed a curtain which hung beside the entrance door and a raincoat which
was draped over the curtain rod (T. 85,
91), scorched and blistered the paint in
the inunediate vicinity (T. 79, 80), deposited soot and grime throughout the room

(t. 84), melted the plastic lenses on
several flourescent light fixtures

(T. 15,

54, 84), melted plastid sheets which served
as dust covers for laboratory equipment

(T. 13, 93), and caused the edge of one
acoustical ceiling tile to "smolder" or
"glow"

(T. 43, 7 8, 7 9, 81) •

The trans-

cript discloses no evidence regarding

-6whether said ceiling tile was installed in
such a manner as to be an integral part of
the Cache County Law Enforcement Building.
The State's witnesses further testified
that appellant was in the building at the
time of the fire and was observed to be
walking in a leisurely manner six or seven
feet from the laboratory door at the time
the fire "gushed" out (T. 9, 40, 67); that
the fire occurred behind a locked metal
door (T. 10, 94); that appellant was
observed by a trusty at the jail kicking
the door and then kneeling near the door
a short time before the fire occurred
(T. 66); and that a book of matches was
taken from appellant's person approximately
25 minutes after the fire was discovered
(T. 41, 42; pl. Exh. 7).

The trusty, who

testified that he saw appellant before the
laboratory door, also testified that
shortly after the fire and before officers
searched appellant, appellant told him

-7that he had no matches and that the trusty
slipped a few matches and part of a striking paper from a book of matches beneath
the door of the cell where appellant was
lodged following the fire so that the latter could smoke.

(T. 68, 76).

A piece

of blackened ceiling tile was introduced
by the State, partially melted light fix-

tures and damaged furnishings together
with numerous photographs of the crime
lab taken after the fire, were also admitted over Mr. Molgard's objections that
they were prejudicial and not relevant or
material to the issues involved.
35).

(T.

31-

Only two of the photographs showed

the area of the crime lab where the fire
actually occurred (pl. Exhs. 1 and 6),
non= showed the ceiling tile where the
"burning" is alleged to have occurred.

All showed superficial damage to the room
and its contents from smoke and heat and
a general condition of clutter and

-

-8-

messiness throughout the laboratory.
Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).

(pl.

At the close

of the State's case, the defense rested
and the court charged the jury regarding
the crime of second-degree arson.

The jury

brought back a verdict of guilty.
The habitual criminal count was then
read to the jury.

An employee of the State

Prison testified for the State that the
appellant had spent time in the prison upon
two prior occasions.

(T. 100, 101, 102) .

The court took judicial notice of plaintiff's Exhibit 14 which consisted of
minute entries entered in criminal cases
numbers 1058 and 1355, each of which was
styled State of Utah v. Michael Nielsen.
(T. 101)

The court instructed the jury

on the charge of being an habitual criminal
and gave the foreman prepared forms of
verdicts
court.
verdict:

which could be returned to the
The jury returned the following

-9-

"We the jury, duly impaneled and
sworn, find the defendant guilty of
being a habitual criminal,
felony,
as charged in the information."
(T.
105; R. 50) [Emphasis added)
At the sentencing hearing February 9,
1970, at Brigham City, Utah, Mr. Molgard
moved to have the verdict on the habitual
criminal count set aside on grounds which
he had previously raised in motions for
dismissal of the habitual criminal count
(T. 97, 108), that the verdict was based
on

void conviction for injuring a pub-

lie jail (criminal case no. 1058), in
which case appellant had been without
representation of counsel.

The motion to

set aside the verdict was denied on the
ground that appellant had voluntarily
waived counsel (T. 110), and appellant was
sentenced to a term of from one to ten
years on the second-degree arson count
and to a term of not less than fifteen
years on the habitual criminal count, with
the sentences to run concurrently.

(T. 112).

-10ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE.
In an effort to prevent local publicity from interfering with the right to a
fair and impartial jury, a defendant may
request that the place of trial be changed.
While it is generally recognized that a
ruling on such a request rests within the
discretion of the trial court, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the
due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution requires a trial before an
impartial jury and that when a change of
venue has not been granted and the circumstances are sufficiently compelling, a
criminal conviction following pretrial
publicity should be set aside even in the
absence of a showing of demonstrable

-11unfairness in the trial itself.

Shepherd

v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v.

Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal
is a basic requirement of due process.
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases.
But our system of law has
always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness . . . . [T]o
perform its high function the best
way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice'." In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543
(1965).
The argument that honest jurors ought
not to be affected by pretrial publicity
as been ably refuted by Chief Justice
Taft.

His classic statement from Turny v.

Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) has been
more recently quoted by the majority in
the Estes Case, regarding the problem of
extrajudicial publication of material
bearing on a criminal matter then before
the court:

-12"[T]he requirement of due process
of law in judicial procedure is not
satisfied by the argument that men
of the highest honor and greatest
self-sacrifice should carry on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man . .
to forget the burden of proof required
to convict a defendant, or which might
lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true between the State and
the accused, denies the latter due
process of law."
381 U.S. 543.
In Shepherd,

Estes, supra, Rideau,

supra and in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466 (1965), the United States Supreme Court
did not consider the actual effect of
extrajudicial utterances on the juries,
but struck down the convictions of the
appellants on the ground that prejudice
was inherent in them.
In other older cases, the United
States Supreme Court has found some actual
unfairness resulting from extrajudicial
publicity and has set aside criminal convictions, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717 (1961); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S.
181 (1952).

Even in the older federal

-13cases voir dire examination of jurors has
not been considered sufficient protection
for the defendant where the prospective
jurors have been exposed to pretrial publicity.

See Marshall v. United States, 360

U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959); Irvin v. Dowd,
supra.
It was unfair to require appellant to
stand trial at the site of the alleged
crime before veniremen who had presumably
been exposed to prejudicial publicity.

A

fair trial for appellant would require that
the jury not consider appellant's prior
convictions until after it had completed
its deliberations on the arson charge.

The

rule of evidence in criminal cases which
renders evidence of wholly independent
offenses irrelevant and inadmissible is
based on due process considerations, a jury
exposed to such evidence being more likely
to convict a defendant because he is a bad

-14man than because of specific guilt of the
crime with which he is charged.

See, 1

Jones, Evidence§ 162 (5th ed. 1958).

This

basic due process requirement is incorporated into the habitual criminal statute itself.
Utah Code Annot. § 76-1-19.

Pretrial news-

paper publicity in the instant case clearly
and repeatedly set forth both appellant's
prior record and the fact that he was
charged with being an habitual criminal.
Appellant's appointed counsel found himself in an impossible position.

Pointed

examination regarding each veniremen's
exposure to pretrial publicity could not
be made because such questions would themselves create prejudice.

Such examination

would have revealed the fact that appellant had a prior criminal record and that
he was charged with being an habitual
criminal.
The family background of appellant
and the pretrial publicity, combined with

-15the inadequacy of a voir dire examination
to insure an impartial jury under the circumstances presented by this case, made a
change of venue an absolute prerequisite to
due process of law.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
PHOTOGRAPHS AND DAMAGED FURNISHINGS AND
FIXTURES FROM THE CRIME LAB.
Count I of the information charged
appellant with the crime of second-degree
arson, a felony, in the language of Utah
1

Code Ann.

(1953), § 76-6-2:

"That on the

I

I 8th day of November,

1969, the said defen-

dant did wilfully and maliciously set
to and burn the Cache County Jail,
a public building.

11

The information raises and places
upon the State the burden of proving three

'I issues

of fact:

(1) was there a "burning"

-16-

or "setting of fire'' to the Cache County
Jail;

(2) was there criminal instrumen-

tality, i.e., wilful and malicious acts,
involved in the burning; and (3) was the
defendant the person responsible.

The

photographs of the crime lab and the
damaged curtain rod, f lourescent fixtures
and flood lamp which were introduced by
the State over the objections of appellant's counsel (Exhs. 1-6, 9, 10, 12, 13),
were not legally relevant nor material to
the issues raised by the information.

This

evidence, at most, tended to show only
collateral facts and circumstances which
had no direct probative value with respect
to any of the above issues.

Neither does

the evidence tend to link up other probative evidence since nothing was introduced to show that anything burned or was
otherwise damaged that constituted a part
of the builaing.

-17The items in question logically tend
to show only that there was heat and smoke

in the Cache County Law Enforcement Crime
Lab at some time before the pictures were
taken and the

fixtures and furnishings

removed, but neither heat nor smoke, nor
even the burning of movables are issues in
an arson case if no fire is communicated
to the building itself.

Dedieu v. People,

22 N.Y. 178 (1860); State v. Levesque,

146 Me. 351, 81 A.2d 665 (1951); O'Daniel
v. State, 188 Ind. 477, 123 N.E. 241 (1911);
Van Morey v. State, 112 Tex. Cir. P. 439,
17 S.W. 2d 50 (1928); Annot., l A.L.R. 1163,
1166

Evidence, although logically

relevant, is irrelevant in the legal sense,
and therefore inadmissible when it tends
to prove that which is not at issue.

See,

1 Jones, Evidence§§ 152, 153 (5th ed. 1958).
None of the State's witnesses testified
that the pictures showed a "burning" or

-18-

"setting of fire to" the building itself,
door, walls, floor, ceiling, fixtures or other integral part.

None of the

fixtures or furnishings introduced, except
perhaps the acoustical tile, had been
burned or consumed in any degree.

None of

them, except possibly the f lourescent ceiling fixtures which were not burned, and the
ceiling tile which may have been, were
parts of the building itself.

While the

fact of damage to furnishings, if shown,
has some tenuous logical relevancy to the
issue of "burning", this alone does not
justify their admission.

To be admissible,

evidence must have some probative force
over and above logical relevancy, which
probative force is properly referred to as
legal relevancy or materiality.

29 Am. Jur.

2d Evidence § 253.
Evidence of collateral facts which are
incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference as to a principal

-19-

fact or matter in dispute is irrelevant
and inadmissible.

In the absence of an

independent showing that something burned
was part of the building itself, evidence
tending to show the collateral facts of
damage to the room by heat and smoke and

of burning of, or damage to, movables,
cannot afford any reasonable presumption

or inference regarding that principal fact

of burning of the building.
Legally irrelevant and inuuaterial
evidence of damage to the laboratory and
its accouterments in this case should have
been excluded not only because of its probable prejudicial effect upon taxpaying
jurors who would naturally feel outrage
as a result of the assault upon their own
pocketbooks inferred by the offered evidence, but also because its admission had
a tendency to draw the jury's attention
away from the real issues in the case.
This latter point is particularly important

-20in a criminal case since the accused is
expected to come prepared to answer only
those things forming the subject matter of
the information on which he is charged and
matters relevant thereto.

The information

in this case gave the appellant no clue
that he would be required to produce evidence to rebut the State's evidence of
damage to movable items of personalty and
fixtures or to any item which was not in
fact burned.

Having no notice of such pre-

judicial and inunaterial matter, he should
not have been expected to be prepared to
rebut it, and in the absence of such opportunity for rebuttal, it should not have
been admitted.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE CASE
TO THE JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT A FINDING ON EVERY ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF THE CORPUS DELICTI.

-21-

All of the evidence submitted, except
part of the testimony of the trusty

re-

garding appellant's behavior before the
fire was discovered, consisted of circumstantial evidence.

No evidence, real or

circumstantial, was introduced by the State
to prove that any of the items with respect
to which evidence was submitted of burning,
were integral parts of the Cache County
Law Enforcement Building.

The circumstan-

tial evidence introduced tended to show
that a curtain and a raincoat were burned
and that an acoustical tile was caused to
"smolder" or "glow."

No evidence was

adduced to demonstrate how any of these
items were, if at all, attached to the
structure of the Cache County Law Enforcement Building.
Some testimony was introduced to the
effect that the raincoat was simply hung
over the curtain rod and that the rod itself
1 fell to the floor in the course of the fire.
I

-22The Court's instruction to the jury virtually
ruled out the possibility of the curtain
being treated as an integral part of the
structure in determining whether there had
been a burning or setting fire to the
structure.

Instruction No. S(E) properly

instructed the jury that a building means
only those parts of the permanent structure
or items which are attached to the building so that they become an integral part
of the building, and this does not include
"personal property such as chairs, tables,
desks or curtains that are unattached by
some fixed method such as screws, nails,
glue or some method distinguishes it from
a temporary arrangement where it is moved
from the building as the occupiers of the
building move from it."

(R. 46) .

No evi-

dence of the existence of such "screws,
nails, glue or other method" distinguishing the curtain from a temporary arrangement was introduced by the State.

-23Similarly, no evidence of any kind was
introduced to show how, if at all, the
acoustical ceiling tile was affixed to the
structure of the building.

Acoustical

ceiling tile is often installed by "suspension" which renders it easily removable
without tools or without damaging the structure of the building in any way.
an installation

In such

the tiles rest upon a

metal framework which is suspended
by wires from the ceiling of the room.

The

wires are in turn attached to hooks which
are screwed into the walls or ceiling of

the structure.

In such an installation

the dantiest of women could probably remove
any given tile from the installation unassisted, simply by raising the tile from

the framework on which it rests, tilting
it slightly and lowering it through the

resulting aperture.

If the acoustical

ceiling tile in the Cache County Law
Enforcement Building was installed in such

-24a manner it would no more constitute an
integral part of the structure than would
the curtains or other such easily removed
embellishments.
To sustain its burden of proof, the
State must introduce evidence to show a
burning of the building.

This burden of

proof is not discharged by introduction
of circumstantial evidence, whether constituting proof of a few facts or a
multitude of facts which are merely consistent with the supposition that a crime
has occurred and that the defendant is
guilty.

So long as one alternative hypo-

thesis is available under any state of
facts with respect to which evidence has
been introduced, which is in any way
inconsistent with either the fact that a
crime has been committed or that the defendant is guilty, no verdict of guilty is
warranted, and the defendant should be
acquitted.

State v. Wells, 35 Utah 400,

-25100 P. 681 (1909); State v. Burch, 100 Utah
414, 115 P.2d 911 (1941).

In this case a

reasonable hypothesis or theory of innocence exists:

that there was no burning

of any integral part of the building.

Even

if it were taken as an established fact
that the curtain and the raincoat were
burned and that the acoustical ceiling tile
was caused to "smolder" or "glow" the reasonable hypothesis still exists that none
of these items constituted a part of the
integral structure of the building, that
therefore there was no burning or setting
of fire to an integral part of the structure of the building within the meaning
of Utah Code Anno. § 76-6-2, and that
therefore no crime was committed and appellant could not possibly then be guilty.
When circumstantial evidence is such that
reasonable men would not differ upon the
fact that it includes an hypothesis of
innocence, it is not a question for the

-26jury but one for the court.

A judgment of

acquittal should then be entered without
submitting the case to the jury.

State v.

Burch, supra, 115 P.2d 912.
If on the other hand circumstantial
evidence concerning the guilt of the accused
is of such a nature that reasonable men
could differ upon the fact of whether it
includes an hypothesis of innocence, and
the matter is submitted to the jury, it
must be accompanied by an instruction that
to convict on such evidence the evidence
must exclude every

hypothesis

of innocence, and such an'instruction
implies that there is a question for the
jury to decide concerning whether the evidence does exclude that hypothesis.
v. Burch, supra.

State

In the instant case, no

such instruction was given.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT

-27APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN A PRIOR CASE

ON WHICH THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CONVICTION
IS BASED.
The United States Supreme Court in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
held that the right of an accused to counsel for his defense which is guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution is
made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and an indigent defendant
in a criminal prosecution in a state court
has the right to have counsel appointed
for him.

The doctrine has retrospective

application.
202

Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S.

(1964); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright,

375 U.S. 2 (1963); Berryhill v. Page, 349
F. 2 d 9 8 4 (10th Cir. 19 6 5) .

Although the right to counsel can be
waived, certain formalities are necessary
before such waiver is effective:

"The

record must show, or there must be an

-28allegation and evidence, which shows the
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the
offer."

Carnley v. Cohran, 369 U.S. 506,

516 (1962).

In the case of an indigent

defendant the right to counsel is not intelligently and understandingly waived unless
the defendant has been warned "not only
that he has the right to consult with an
attorney but also that if he is indigent
a lawyer wi.11 be appointed to represent him."
Cf., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Although the Miranda Case is distinguishable as a Fifth Amendment case, the statements made therein regarding the standard
of procedural safeguards required have been
properly interpreted as definitive enunciations of the Federal Constitutional Law
on the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment.

See, Abercrombie v. State,

428 P.2d 505 (Ida. 1967).
In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109

-29(1967), the record of a prior conviction
necessary to establish habitual criminality was silent with regard to the offer of
counsel to assist the indigent defendant.
The trial court admitted the record into
evidence, but subsequently instructed the
jury not to consider the prior offenses
for any purpose, and the punishment imposed
by the jury was not enhanced under the
Texas recidivism statute.

The United

States Supreme Court nonetheless reversed
the conviction of the defendant on the
first count holding (1) the records of the
prior conviction raised a presumption that
the defendant had been denied his right
to counsel and that the prior conviction
was void, and (2) the admission in evidence of the record of the prior conviction
resulted in defendant's suffering anew from
the deprivation of his Sixth Amendment
right and was inherently prejudicial and
required reversal of the conviction even

-30though enhanced punishment had not been
imposed.

In the course of its opinion the

court made the following pronouncement:
"In this case the certified record of
the Tennessee convictions on their
face raise a presumption that petitioner was denied his right to counsel
in the Tennessee proceedings, and
therefore that his conviction was
void. Presuming waiver of counsel
from a silent record is impermissible .
. To permit a conviction obtained
in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright
to be used against a person either to
support guilt or enhance punishment
for another offense . . . is to erode
the principle of that case. Worse
yet, since the defect in the prior
conviction was denial of the right to
counsel, the accused in effect suffers
anew from the deprivation of that
Sixth Amendment right."
389 U.S. 114,
115. [Emphasis added]
In a habeas corpus case which arose
under the Utah habitual criminal statute,
the question of denial of right to counsel on the occasion of a previous felony
conviction was raised.

In Clark v. Turner,

283 F. Supp. 909 (C.D. Utah 1968), the
defendant had been informed of his right
to counsel and asked if he desired the
assistance of counsel, but he had not been

-31told, or at least the record did not disclose the fact that he had been told, of
his right to court-appointed counsel.

The

Federal District Court, following the
Burgett decision, held that the defendant
in that case had not waived his right to
counsel because one cannot understandably
waive a right he does not know he has.
283 F. Supp. at 913.
The decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the Burgett Case, supra,
was handed down after the decision of
this Court in Clark v. Turner, 16 Utah 2d
197, 398 P.2d 202 (1965), in which this
Court summarily rejected the primary contention made here regarding right to
counsel.

The Burgett decision led to

reversal of the position taken by the
Federal District Court for the Central
District of Utah and by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Clark v. Turner, 350
F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1965) wherein it had

-32been held that the improper habitual criminal sentence could not be attacked so
long as the conviction and sentence on the
first count of the defendant's conviction
still stood and his sentence on that
count had not been terminated.

Clark v.

Turner, 274 F. Supp. 285 (C.D. Utah 1968).
More recently the United States Supreme
Court has squarely faced the question of
whether a concurrent sentence bars consideration on appeal of defects in another
conviction and has fully repudiated the
"concurrent sentence doctrine."

Benton

v. Mary land, 3 9 5 U.S. 7 8 4, . 7 8 7 ( 19 6 9) .
is clear, therefore, that this Court should
not fail to set aside the invalid habitual
criminal conviction of appellant in the
instant case even if it should sustain
the second-degree arson conviction.
In the instant case, the appellant
was only 18 years of age and poorly educated when convicted without aid of counsel

-33-

f

of the crime of injuring a public jail.
There are no facts which would indicate
that appellant was aware that he had a
right to have counsel appointed by the
court in the absence of his being so
informed by the court.

No evidence of

appellant having prior experience with
criminal procedure appears in the record.
The Burgett Case makes it clear that
where the record is silent on whether the
court informed a defendant of his right
to have court-appointed counsel, no presumption may be indulged that such information was given.

In fact, prior to the

Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright, supra, information concerning
right to appointed

counsel was generally

not given to defendants by the courts.
Only since the Miranda Case, supra, has
it been standard practice for courts to
inform defendants of their right to courtappointed counsel.

-34Appellant's age and his lack of education and experience at the time of his
conviction for injuring a public jail clearly
distinguish this case from other cases in
which this Court has found that the appellants in fact suffered no disadvantage
not being informed of their right to courtappointed counsel because they in fact were
sufficiently experienced in matters of
criminal procedure to know that they were
entitled to such counsel.

Distinguish

e.g., Mayne v. Turner, no. 11922

....

April 21, 1970); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah
2d 96, 440 P. 2d 968 (1968).
POINT V
THE VERDICT RETURNED ON THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL COUNT IS VOID ON ITS FACE.
This Court has made it clear in two
separate cases that the Utah habitual criminal statute does not create a crime.
Being an habitual criminal is a status,

-35and to be charged with being an habitual
criminal is not to be charged with a
crime.

The sole purpose of the habitual

criminal statute is to make more severe
the punishment for the third in a series
of three felony convictions.

State v.

Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 268 P.2d 998, 1000
(1954); Zeimer v. Turner, 14 Utah 2d 232,
381 P.2d 721 (1963).
The lower court erred in submitting
a form of verdict to the jury which allowed a finding that appellant had committed an additional felony in being an
habitual criminal.

The form of verdict

submitted in the instant case could only
have confused the jury and created a
misunderstanding of what the jury was
required to consider and to find.

The

inference thus raised that appellant may
have committed not only three crimes with
to which proof had been introduced
at trial, but also an additional crime of

-------·----

-36-

being an habitual criminal, was obviously
prejudicial.

In any event, the verdict

returned on the second count of the information did not correspond to the allegation
of the information or to the habitual criminal statute, and the jury's intention is
thus rendered unclear.

It purported to

find appellant guilty of a nonexistent
crime with which he had never been charged.
Although verdicts are liberally construed
when the jury's intention is clear, they
must be set aside where there is irrecconcilable inconsistency between them and
the formal criminal charge.

Patterson v.

United States, 2 Wheat. 271 (1817); Smith
v. State, 177 P.2d 523 (1947); State v.
Kolkow, 110 Kan. 722, 205 P. 639 (1922);
Donovan v. People, 520, 522, 74 N.E. 772
(1905).

The verdict in this case is void

on its face and should be reversed under
general due process considerations completely apart from double jeopardy

-37arguments which have heretofore been
rejected by this Court in Clark v. Turner,

19 Utah 2d 210, 429 P.2d 262 (1967).
POINT VI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING TWO
SEPARATE CONCURRENT SENTENCES ON APPELLANT

WHO WAS CONVICTED OF ONLY ONE CRIME AND THE
SENTENCES ARE VOID.
Since being an habitual criminal is

not a crime, no sentence may be separately
imposed upon a verdict that the defendant
is an habitual criminal.

The verdict of

the jury on an habitual criminal charge
affects only the severity of the sentence

to be imposed for the third felony conviction.

Utah Code Anno. § 76-1-18 (1953).

Otherwise the habitual criminal statute
itself would be invalid as a scheme to
place defendants twice in jeopardy for the
same offense.

In this case a sentence of

from one to ten years was imposed on

-38appellant for the crime of second-degree
arson, the only real crime of which he was
found guilty in this proceeding.

The addi-

tional sentence of a minimum of fifteen
years is an entirely gratuitous and erroneous sentence which is not authorized by
the habitual criminal statute.

Even if the

conviction for second-degree arson should
stand, the additional sentence imposed for
the separate "felony" of being an habitual
criminal should be vacated.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787

Benton v.
(1969}; Clark

v. Turner, 274 F. Supp. 285, 913 (C.D. Utah
19 6 8) •
CONCLUSION
The appellant's defense was unfairly
disadvantaged in defending against the
information through the lower court's
refusal to transfer the case to another
location where appellant and his family
were not held in disrepute and where

--
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prejudicial pretrial publicity regarding
previous offenses had not been circulated
by the news media.

His defense was further

prejudiced with respect to the seconddegree arson charge by admission of
irrelevant and irrunaterial damaged furnishings from the Cache County Crime Lab and
by admission of irrelevant and immaterial
photographs of

crime lab, in the ab-

sence of prior evidence or any evidence
at all, that some part of the integral
structure of the building had been burned
or consumed in any degree or that would
tie this evidence of purely collateral
facts to the issues in the case.

Further-

more, in the absence of some evidence of
a burning of the building itself, appellant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal, or at least to an express instruction
that the jury must find that the evidence
excluded every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence to convict.

-40Regardless of what view the Court
may take of the conduct of the trial on
the second-degree arson charge, appellant
is entitled to have the additional "felony"
sentence on the second count of the information voided because he did not waive his
right to counsel in criminal case number
1058, on which the status of habitual
criminality is dependent, because the
verdict on this count was inconsistent
with the information and the statute· and
because a separate sentence on this count
is not authorized by law in any event.
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